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ERISA-THE FIRST DECADE: WAS
THE LEGISLATION CONSISTENT
WITH OTHER NATIONAL GOALS?
Alicia H. Munnell*
Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA)' in response to documented failures of the
private pension system. Prior to the federal legislation, some
employers imposed such stringent vesting and participation
standards that many workers reached retirement age only to dis-
cover that a layoff, merger, or other break in service made them
ineligible for a pension. Even workers who satisfied their plans'
participation and vesting requirements had no assurance that
accumulated pension fund assets would adequately finance ben-
efits. Although employers were expected to fund their plans over
periods of ten to forty years, they were not legally required to do
so. Workers covered by inadequately funded plans risked losing
pension benefits if their plans were terminated.
Not only were many plans funded inadequately, but a few
were administered in a dishonest, incompetent, or irresponsible
way. Other forms of financial manipulation, while not illegal,
also jeopardized the welfare of plan participants. Pension assets
were often concentrated in the stock of the plan-sponsoring
company or used to make large loans to that company. This dis-
regard for diversification of pension plans' assets often left work-
ers' benefits dependent on the financial condition of their
company.
In the pre-ERISA era, pension plan participants were gener-
ally at the mercy of plan sponsors. If the pension plan lacked
sufficient funding or suffered investment losses, the claimants
could forfeit part or all of their benefits. In spite of this uncer-
* Senior Vice President and Director of Research, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
B.A., 1964, Wellesley College; M.A., 1966, Boston University; Ph.D., 1973, Harvard Uni-
versity. This Article was originally prepared to appear in THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT
INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: THE FIRST DECADE (1984), an information paper prepared
for use by the Special Committee on Aging of the United States Senate. A version also
appeared in the Nov./Dec. 1984 NEw ENGLAND ECONOMIC REVIEW, a publication of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
1. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 5, 18, 26, 29, 31 & 42 U.S.C.).
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tainty, employees often negotiated for pension benefits that they
believed were legally secure forms of deferred compensation.
2
After ten years of hearings and prolonged debate, Congress
adopted ERISA in 1974. As its principal objective, the legisla-
tion sought to secure the rights of plan participants so that a
greater number of covered workers would receive their promised
benefits.3 To this end, the legislation regulated five aspects of
pensions: reporting and disclosure of plan administration; em-
ployee participation and vesting standards; funding schedules
and fiduciary integrity; retirement plans for the self-employed;
and the delivery of vested benefits.' ERISA's participation and
vesting standards enable workers to establish a legal claim to
benefits. The implementation of funding and fiduciary standards
and the establishment of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corpora-
tion 5 ensure that money remains available to pay these legal
benefit claims.
Most observers agree that ERISA has been successful in meet-
ing its stated objectives. This Article assesses the extent to
which the provisions and implications of ERISA are consistent
with federal tax provisions, employment policy, and retirement
income objectives. Three general conclusions emerge from the
following analysis. First, any consistency between ERISA and
other government policies exists coincidentally. Congress gave
almost no consideration to the impact of ERISA on employment
or overall retirement income. Even consistency with tax policy,
although cited as a motivation for federal regulation of private
pension plans, received little weight during the congressional de-
bates. Second, in some areas, such as employment policy, no
clearly defined and internally consistent national policy exists,
so that any assessment of the consistency of ERISA with such
objectives is necessarily ambiguous. Finally, to the extent that
2. For evidence that workers trade off current wages for future retirement benefits,
see Schiller & Weiss, Pensions and Wages: A Test for Equalizing Differences, 62 REv.
ECON. & STATISTICS 529 (1980); Ehrenberg & Smith, The Wage/Pension Trade-Off, in
THE FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON PENSION POLICY, COMING OF AGE:
TOWARD A NATIONAL RETIREMENT INCOME POLICY 1200 (1981) [hereinafter cited as PRES.
COMM'N REP.].
3. ERISA § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982).
4. Reporting & disclosure-ERISA §§ 101-111, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (1982); partic-
ipation & vesting-ERISA §§ 201-211, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1061 (1982); funding-ERISA
§§ 301-306, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1086 (1982); fiduciary responsibility-ERISA §§ 401-414,
29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114 (1982); retirement plans for the self-employed-26 U.S.C. §§ 404,
408 (1982); administrative enforcement-ERISA §§ 501-514, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1145
(1982); plan termination insurance-ERISA §§ 4001-4068, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1368 (1982).
5. ERISA § 4002(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (1982) establishes the Pension Benefit Guar-
anty Corporation within the Department of Labor.
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national objectives exist in taxation, employment, or retirement
income policies, the provisions and implications of ERISA ap-
pear more or less consistent with these goals, although some in-
teresting anomalies exist.
Although ERISA explicitly sanctioned defined contribution
plans as a legitimate form of retirement saving, this Article fo-
cuses almost exclusively on defined benefit plans. ERISA aimed
at changing the basic provisions of defined benefit plans, not at
modifying the nature of defined contribution plans.' Therefore,
although a study of the consistency of pension plan provisions
with national economic goals would necessarily include an analy-
sis of both defined benefit and defined contribution plans, a
study of the impact of ERISA seems appropriately limited to
defined benefit plans.
I. ERISA AND FEDERAL TAX POLICY
The report of the President's Committee on Corporate Pen-
sion Funds, a committee President Kennedy established in 1962,
cited favorable treatment of private pensions under the tax laws
as a reason for government regulation of pension plans.7 Under
current law, compensation in the form of employer contributions
to qualified pension and profit-sharing plans is deductible, like
wages, by the employer when the contributions are made,' but,
unlike wages, is not taxed to the employee until the benefits are
distributed. Deferral until retirement of taxes on compensation
in the form of pension contributions offers an employee three
advantages over compensation in the form of wages. First, the
full dollar of contribution, without any reduction for income tax,
remains available for investment during the employee's working
years. Second, an employee does not pay tax on the investment
income from accumulated pension assets, whereas an employee
pays federal income tax on interest earned from his ordinary
savings as the income accrues. Finally, when benefits are distrib-
uted, they are likely to be taxed at a lower marginal rate than if
they had been taxed as they accrued to the employee, because
6. Individual retirement accounts and the expansion of Keogh plans provide two
exceptions.
7. PRESIDENT'S COMMITEE ON CORPORATE PENSION FUNDS AND OTHER PRIVATE RE-
TIREMENT AND WELFARE PROGRAMS, PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE PENSION PROGRAMS: A
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON PRIVATE EMPLOYEE REREMENT PLANS 11 (1965) [hereinaf-
ter cited as PRES. COMM. ON CORPORATE PENSION FUNDS].
8. 26 U.S.C. § 404 (1982).
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the employee's income is usually lower after retirement and sub-
ject to the double exemption for persons over sixty-five.9
The special tax provisions for pension plans date from 1921,
but Congress first attempted to use the tax code to influence the
design and operation of private pension plans in 1938. To pre-
vent employers from using pensions simply as tax avoidance
schemes, the Revenue Act of 1938 included a "nondiversion
rule" to make pension trusts irrevocable, so that employers
could not take large deductions for contributions during years of
high earnings and then recapture those earnings by revoking the
trust in poor years.10 To ensure that employers did not establish
pensions solely for small groups of officers and key employees in
high-income brackets, the Revenue Act of 1942 completely re-
vised the definition of an exempt person or profit-sharing trust
and significantly broadened the participation standards by re-
quiring that plans be nondiscriminatory for tax qualification
purposes."
The Treasury Department issued numerous regulations from
1942 to 1954 to ensure that tax incentives aimed at encouraging
the growth of pension plans were not abused. These regulations
sought to prevent discrimination in favor of shareholders, of-
ficers, supervisors, and other highly compensated individuals in
either coverage, benefits, or financing and to protect the federal
coffers against excessive and unjustified tax deductions. Al-
though Congress extensively revised the Internal Revenue Code
in 1954, it made few substantive changes in the sections covering
private pension plans.
Thus, the goal of federal tax policy since 1942 has been to en-
courage, through favorable tax provisions, the use of tax-quali-
fied pension and profit-sharing plans to ensure greater retire-
ment security for employees in general and not just the highly
paid few. In other words, the rationale for favorable tax treat-
ment of qualified pension plans is that retirement benefits for
rank and file employees will exist if Congress provides tax incen-
tives that induce higher paid employees to support the establish-
ment of employer-sponsored pension plans. Before the enact-
ment of ERISA, however, the tax code contained no mandate for
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to police the actuarial
soundness of pension plans, and provided little protection for
the pension rights of individual participants.
9. 26 U.S.C. § 151(c)(1) (1982).
10. Revenue Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-554, § 165, 52 Stat. 447, 518.
11. Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, § 162, 56 Stat. 798, 862-67.
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Title II of ERISA, an amendment to the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, establishes participation, vesting, and funding
standards that pension plans must satisfy to qualify for
favorable tax treatment. Title II also contains provisions
designed to expand coverage of tax-favored forms of retirement
savings, 12 and provisions that limit the benefits or contributions
an individual can receive under a qualified plan.13
ERISA's provisions are generally consistent with federal tax
policy, because the legislation's principal goal was to ensure that
employees of companies with qualified pension plans receive
benefits. ERISA's participation and vesting standards go beyond
the tax code's traditional discrimination concerns and aim at en-
suring the accrual and preservation of benefits. These standards
reflect the conviction that favorable tax treatment of pension
plan contributions is justified only if pension plans actually pro-
vide significant retirement income for broad groups of
employees.
A. Enforcing Broad-Based Receipt of Benefits
Title I of ERISA provides a series of minimum standards
designed to enhance the likelihood that workers will secure pen-
sion rights. Vesting and participation rules"' brought into pen-
sion plans workers who might otherwise have been excluded and
helped ensure that workers' long years of service would result in
eventual pension receipt. 5 To prevent violation of the spirit of
12. 26 U.S.C. §§ 404, 408 (1982).
13. Under ERISA, the largest annual benefit payable to any individual under a de-
fined benefit plan was the lesser of $75,000 or 100% of average annual compensation
during his three consecutive highest paid years. 26 U.S.C. § 415(b)(1) (1976). Under a
defined contribution plan, the annual addition to an employee's account was limited to
the lesser of $25,000 or 25% of compensation. 26 U.S.C. § 415(c)(1) (1976). These limits
were subject to the automatic cost-of-living adjustments applied to social security bene-
fits. In 1982, the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 235(a),
96 Stat. 324, 505 reduced these limits from their adjusted levels to the lesser of $90,000
for defined benefit plans or 100% of average compensation for highest years, 26 U.S.C.A.
§ 415(b)(1) (West Supp. 1984), and to the lesser of $30,000 for defined contribution plans
or 25% of the participant's compensation, 26 U.S.C.A. § 415(c)(1) (West Supp. 1984).
The limits are still subject to automatic adjustments. 26 U.S.C.A. § 415(d)(1) (West
Supp. 1984).
14. ERISA §§ 201-211, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1061 (1982).
15. The vesting objectives may be achieved in one of three ways: (1) 100% vesting
after 10 years of credited service; (2) 25% vesting after 5 years of service, 5% additional
vesting for each of the next 5 years, and 10% additional vesting for the following 5 years;
or (3) the "rule of 45," whereby there is 50% vesting when the employee's combination
of age and service (a minimum of 5 years) equals 45 and 10% additional vesting for the
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earlier vesting by employers' "backloading" the benefit formulas,
ERISA introduced rules designed to prevent the disproportion-
ate accrual of benefits until late in the worker's employment."6
ERISA also established specific guidelines for defining a "break
in service. ' 17 The combination of the participation, vesting,
backloading, and break-in-service rules has improved employees'
chances of accruing the right to pension benefits.
To ensure that vested pension benefits are actually paid,
ERISA established funding schedules, mandated fiduciary stan-
dards, and created the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
(PBGC), which guarantees payment of essentially vested bene-
fits, up to a specified dollar limit, in the event of plan termina-
tion. "' ERISA also established fiduciary responsibility for pen-
sion plan trustees, for investment managers, and for any other
person who may have control over a plan's assets. 9 Responsible
financial management, combined with stricter funding stand-
ards, should ensure that adequate funds remain available to pay
benefits.
In short, ERISA's provisions increase the likelihood that an
employee covered by a qualified pension plan will receive retire-
ment benefits. This development is fully consistent with the goal
of federal tax policy to ensure that rank and file workers receive
supplementary retirement benefits by providing tax incentives
that encourage establishment of retirement savings plans.
B. Individual Retirement Accounts-The Exception
Generally, ERISA operates consistently with national tax pol-
icy. A provision included in ERISA to expand the coverage of
next 5 years. ERISA § 203(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2) (1982).
16. ERISA § 204(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b) (1982); 26 U.S.C. § 411(b) (1982). See D.
McGILL, FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 97-98 (5th ed. 1984).
17. ERISA § 202, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1052 (West 1985); ERISA § 203, 29 U.S.C.A. 1053
(West 1985); 26 U.S.C.A. § 410 (West 1985); 29 C.F.R. § 2530.200b-4 (1985); 26 C.F.R.
§ 1.410(a)-5 (1985); 26 C.F.R. § 1.410(a)-7 (1985). See D. McGILL, supra note 16, at 86-
87.
18. The PBGC guarantees the payment of what it terms "basic benefits," which in-
clude all retirement, death, and disability benefits of current retirees and their benefi-
ciaries, and the normal retirement benefit payable in monthly installments for vested
current employees. Basic benefits do not include lump-sum and special supplementary
benefits payable under some plans to encourage early retirement, or death and disability
benefits not in current payment status. See Munnell, Guaranteeing Private Pension
Benefits: A Potentially Expensive Business, NEW ENGLAND EcONOMIc REVIEW, Mar./Apr.
1982, at 24.
19. ERISA §§ 401-414, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114 (1982).
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private pension arrangements, however, has caused discrimina-
tory tax treatment of certain pension plans. In an attempt to
offer retirement income opportunities to more individuals,
ERISA authorized a new form of retirement plan, namely the
individual retirement account (IRA). Beginning in 1975, persons
not covered by either an employer plan or a Keogh plan could
establish an IRA and make tax-deductible contributions to it
equal to fifteen percent of their income, up to a maximum of
$1,500.20 Almost immediately, however, an equity question arose.
The statute prohibited employees covered by pension plans from
making tax-deductible IRA contributions 21 even though their
employer's contributions to their pension plans might be quite
small, or might never vest because of frequent job changes. In
some instances employees withdrew from active plan participa-
tion to set up IRAs. In an attempt to alleviate this inequity, the
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 expanded eligibility to
IRAs to encompass all workers, including those currently cov-
ered by pension plans.2
Although IRAs fulfill the nation's policy of providing tax in-
centives to encourage saving for retirement, IRAs conflict with
the policy that favorable tax provisions concerning pension plans
should apply nondiscriminatingly. A significantly greater per-
centage of higher paid employees use the IRA deduction than
lower paid employees. Indeed, survey data indicate that fifty-
eight percent of individuals earning over $50,000 contributed to
an IRA in 1982 compared to only seventeen percent of people
earning between $15,000 and $20,000 (see Table 1 on following
page).
20. Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 2002, 88 Stat. 829, 958-71 (1974).
21. Id.
22. Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 311, 95 Stat. 172, 274-83 (1981) (amending 26 U.S.C. § 219
(1976)).
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TABLE 1
Usage of Individual Retirement Accounts and Employer-Provided
Pension Plans in 1982, by 1983 Earnings Levels
Percent with
1983 Percent employer-provided
Earnings levels with IRAsa pension plansa
Total 16.9% 43.1%
$1- 4,999 7.1 7.8






50,000 and over 57.6 74.4
aPercentages exclude respondents whose earnings were not reported.
Source: Employee Benefit Research Institute Issue Brief, Individual Retirement Ac-
counts: Characteristics and Policy Implications, July 1984, at 18 (Table 18).
This disparity among income groups' use of IRAs far exceeds
that found in pension coverage generally, except in the case of
the lowest income groups. Thus, the IRA provisions ERISA in-
troduced violate the basic goal of tax policy in the pension area:
to encourage pension provisions that ensure employees at all
levels of compensation relatively comparable retirement
protection.
C. Maintaining Integration-Perhaps Another Exception?
Although only nondiscriminatory private pension plans qual-
ify for favorable tax treatment, an employer may consider its
contributions to social security in determining whether its plan
discriminates in favor of officers, shareholders, or higher paid ex-
ecutives. This approach adopts the premise that public and pri-
vate retirement programs should function as a unified system.
Thus, if the social security program favors low-income workers,
the private pension system should favor high-income workers so
that all workers will receive the same percentage of their earn-
ings as retirement benefits. Congress incorporated this reasoning
[VOL. 19:1
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for "integration" into the tax code in 1942.23 Basically, the IRS
finds pension plans nondiscriminatory if the ratio of combined
benefits to earnings remains relatively constant for employees
whose wages exceed the taxable wage base and for employees
with fully covered wages. Nonetheless, the question remains
whether existing integration procedures under ERISA operate
consistently with the goals of federal tax policy.
2 4
The IRS integration guidelines allow or encourage the pay-
ment of tax subsidized benefits to higher paid workers, while
permitting the denial of benefits to some lower paid workers.2 5
During its deliberations on ERISA in 1974, Congress recognized
the inequities that existed under the IRS integration guidelines.
Subsequently, both the House Committee on Ways and Means
and the Conference Committee voted to freeze further integra-
tion pending full consideration of the issue. In the face of last-
minute opposition by employers and pension practitioners, how-
ever, Congress rejected the freeze proposal.
Employers defend integration on the ground that without it
they would have to provide more than 100% of preretirement
pay to lower paid workers in retirement, to ensure adequate ben-
efits, as a percent of pay, to higher paid ones. Employers con-
tend that the cost of these excessively high benefits for lower
paid workers would result in much lower wages for these workers
and an unnecessary reduction in their preretirement standard of
living.
Despite the protestations of employers, reforms have been
proposed to narrow the discrepancy between the ratio of retire-
ment benefits to preretirement pay for higher paid workers and
for lower paid workers. 26 These reform proposals respond to two
troubling basic issues that the existing integration procedures
23. Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, § 162, 56 Stat. 798, 862-67.
24. For a thorough discussion of the issues surrounding integration, see J. SCHULZ &
T. LEAVITT, PENSION INTEGRATION: CONCEPTS, ISSUES AND PROPOSALS (1983); STAFF OF THE
SUBCOMM. ON FISCAL POLICY OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 93D CONG., 2D SESS., INTE-
GRATION OF PRIVATE PENSION PLANS WITH SOCIAL SECURITY, STUDIES IN PUBLIC WELFARE,
Paper No. 18, 174-75 (Comm. Print 1974) (prepared by R. Schmitt).
25. The current guidelines include provision for integration through either an "ex-
cess" or an "offset" method. Under a pure excess plan, the employer can limit benefits to
that portion of an employee's final average pay in excess of the "integration level." The
integration level is a career average of the social security wage base applicable to a par-
ticular employee. For instance, an employee reaching retirement age in 1984 would face
an integration level of $12,840, and an integrated plan could pay benefits in 1984 up to
37.5% of final pay in excess of $12,840 without providing any benefits below that level.
Under the offset method of integration, an employer can reduce a worker's pension bene-
fit by as much as 831/3 % of a worker's primary social security benefit.
26. See, e.g., A. MUNNELL, THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 56-59 (1982).
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raise. First, if workers in fact pay for pension benefits through-
out their working lives through reduced wages, it seems difficult
to justify provisions that may deny lower paid employees retire-
ment benefits.
Additionally, integration apparently operates on the assump-
tion that social security benefits fully replace the preretirement
earnings of low- and middle-income workers. Yet, this is not the
case. As shown in Table 2, social security benefits amount to
only thirty-five percent to forty-seven percent of preretirement
earnings for individuals and couples in the bottom two quintiles
of the income distribution. Even taking into account that social
security benefits are nontaxable for this group,2" replacement
rates still do not exceed sixty-five percent of low-income em-
ployees' earnings before retirement. Therefore, lower paid em-
ployees and their families experience a substantial drop in their
standard of living in retirement, unless they receive supplemen-
tary private pensions or have saved considerable sums on their
own.
TABLE 2
Median Social Security Replacement Rates-Before and After
Tax-for Men, Nonmarried Women, and Married Couples, by
Preretirement Earnings Levelsa
Median social security Median after-tax social
replacement rate security replacement rate
Preretirement
earnings All Nonmarried Married All Nonmarried Married
quintilesb men women couples men women couples
Lowest 44 47 n.a. n.a. 60 63
Second 35 39 n.a. n.a. 47 51
Third 32 33 n.a. n.a. 44 44
Fourth 26 28 n.a. n.a. 42 36
Highest 18 2 2c n.a. n.a. 33 28
n.a.-not available.
a Social security benefits as a percent of estimated total price-indexed earnings in
the highest 3 of the last 10 years.
b Quintiles derived from combined earnings distribution of all sample respondents.
Quintile boundaries are-6,283, $9,290, $12,780, and $16,246.
c Based on 50 or fewer cases; subject to high sampling variability.
Source: Fox, Earnings Replacement Rates and Total Income: Findings from the Retire-
ment History Study, Soc. SECURrIY BuLL., Oct. 1982, at 13, 20 (Tables 7, 10).
27. 26 U.S.C. § 86 (1982).
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D. The Implications of Favoring Employer Contributions
ERISA maintained the asymmetry between tax treatment of
employer and employee contributions to qualified pension plans.
While an employee pays no tax for employer contributions until
she receives retirement benefits, an employee makes mandatory
contributions from net after-tax income. As a result of this
asymmetry, private pension plans in this country are financed
almost entirely on a noncontributory, employer-financed basis.
This emphasis on employer-financed plans works against the
policy of the Internal Revenue Code and ERISA of ensuring
broad-based receipt of benefits.
When employers finance pensions, employees have no immedi-
ate claim on contributions, even though they have implicitly ac-
cepted lower wages in return for pension coverage. Rather, enti-
tlement to benefits based on employer contributions hinges on
specific provisions of the pension plan. Even though the partici-
pation and vesting standards ERISA established significantly
improved employees' rights, many workers covered by private
plans who fail to complete the ten-year vesting requirement will
not receive benefits.
If employees were to finance their pensions through tax de-
ferred contributions, the trade-off between pension coverage and
wages would become explicit. The employee would also have an
immediate right to the accumulated contributions even if ulti-
mate entitlement to benefits remained contingent on satisfying a
ten-year vesting standard. An employee could transfer accumu-
lated contributions to either an IRA or a new plan upon chang-
ing jobs. Thus, employee-financed plans would reduce forfeiture
of earned pension rights and would probably lead to greater
portability within the private pension system. Furthermore, if
plans were financed by employees, any inequities inherent in the
current IRS integration guidelines would become obvious. If
lower paid workers, like their higher paid counterparts, were to
receive lower wages in exchange for deferred pension income, no
justification would exist for denying them benefits at retirement.
Employee contributions would clarify the issue; either low-paid
workers would contribute and become eligible for benefits, or
they would make no contributions and rely solely on social se-
curity for retirement income.
One further problem remains that is probably insolvable. The
tax concessions for pension plans represent a loss to the Treas-
ury of significant revenues. Although controversy exists concern-
FALL 1985]
Journal of Law Reform
ing the precise amount of this revenue loss, the amount is un-
doubtedly quite large.28 The Treasury Department calculates a
tax expenditure for public and private pension plans that
amounted to $50 billion in 1984.29 In addition, the Treasury esti-
mates that favorable treatment of IRAs costs the federal govern-
ment another $9 billion.30 Only half the work force is covered by
a pension plan and only seventeen percent utilize IRAs (Table
1); yet all taxpayers must pay higher taxes to make up for these
foregone revenues. With such an inequitable distribution of tax
concessions, proposals constantly surface for either eliminating
the favorable tax provisions for private plans or making coverage
universal so that all workers can enjoy the advantages of
deferral.8"
II. ERISA AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY
In 1962 President Kennedy directed the Committee on Corpo-
rate Pension Funds to explore, among other issues, how pension
plans could "contribute more effectively to efficient manpower
utilization and mobility. 3 2 In response, the Committee reported
on three separate but interrelated effects of private pension
plans on manpower: (1) labor mobility; (2) employment opportu-
nities for older workers; and (3) retirement behavior. Underlying
the Committee's analysis of each of these aspects of manpower
policy was an explicit or implicit statement of a desirable na-
tional objective. In some areas, these national manpower goals
remain the same today as two decades ago; in other areas, some
changes have occurred.
The effect of pensions on labor mobility has remained an im-
portant concern of manpower policy. As the Committee's report
noted, "In a changing and growing economy, continuing shifts in
28. See Employee Benefit Research Institute Issue Brief, Retirement Program Tax
Expenditures: A Case of Unsubstantiated, Undocumented, Arbitrary Numbers (Apr.
1983); Hearings on Administration and Other Proposals Concerning Tax Shelters, Ac-
counting Abuses, and Corporate and Securities Reforms Before the House Comm. on
Ways and Means, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. A-1 to A-5 (1984) (statement of Alicia Munnell,
Vice President, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston).
29. BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1985, SPECIAL ANALY-
SES, G-47 (Table G-2) (Revenue Loss Estimates for Tax Expenditures by Function).
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, 98TH CONG., 2D SEss., THE EMPLOYEE
RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: THE FIRST DECADE 130 (Comm. Print 1984)
(chapter by D. Grubbs) [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING].
32. PRES. COMM. ON CORPORATE PENSION FUNDS, supra note 7, iii (quoting memoran-
dum from Pres. Kennedy to the Committee, Mar. 28, 1962).
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the occupational, industrial, and geographical needs for man-
power take place. Private pensions, along with seniority and
other benefits based on length of service, tend to reduce labor
mobility by tying workers to a particular employer. 3 3 Maintain-
ing a mobile labor force is considered just as desirable today as
it was in the early 1960's. An efficient allocation of resources re-
quires an adaptable work force willing to relocate in response to
changing demands. Ironically, of course, any attempt to alleviate
the adverse impact of pensions on labor mobility conflicts with
one of the major motivations for the development of private
pensions-namely, increasing job tenure. Additionally, excess
turnover can result in costly and inefficient utilization of
resources.
The employment of older workers has become, at least theo-
retically, a more important goal since the early 1960's. Despite
the continuing liberalization of early-retirement provisions in
private plans and the trend toward earlier retirement, national
legislation seems premised on the desirability of keeping older
workers in the labor force. The 1978 Amendments to the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, which raise the age for
mandatory retirement from sixty-five to seventy," and the 1983
Amendments to the Social Security Act, which extend gradually
the age for normal retirement benefits from sixty-five to sixty-
seven,35 represent the two most obvious examples. As in the case
of mobility, however, any changes in the structure of pension
plans to encourage the employment of older workers directly
contradict one of the primary motives for the introduction of
pensions, namely retiring superannuated employees.
With regard to the third dimension of manpower policy, re-
tirement behavior, the Committee argued that pension plan pro-
visions should operate neutrally. In short, older employees
should not be pushed out of the labor force to alleviate unem-
ployment problems for younger cohorts, yet adequate retirement
income ought to exist for those who choose to retire. Today, na-
tional policy is schizophrenic on the issue of retirement. Pension
arrangements in the private sector enable earlier and earlier re-
tirement, while public policy developments generally encourage
older workers to remain in the labor force. For example, the
1983 Social Security Amendments increased the delayed retire-
ment credit for workers who postpone retirement beyond the
33. Id. at 27.
34. Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 3, 92 Stat. 189, 189 (amending 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1976)).
35. Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 201, 97 Stat. 65, 107-09 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 416 (1982)).
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normal retirement age,36 and the provision that gradually ex-
tends the retirement age will further reduce the benefits availa-
ble to workers who choose to retire early."
After identification of some of the major goals of employment
policy that private pension plan regulations may affect, the
question arises whether the reforms ERISA enacted are gener-
ally consistent or inconsistent with these goals.
A. The Impact of ERISA on Mobility
Delayed vesting and the lack of post-termination indexing are
the main characteristics of pension plans that impede labor mo-
bility. The absence of portability is also discussed in this con-
text, but it is unclear how improved portability would reduce the
potential loss for the mobile employee unless accompanied by
some form of post-termination indexing. ERISA probably im-
proved labor mobility by accelerating vesting, but significant im-
pediments remain because the legislation failed to address the
impact of inflation on the vested benefits of terminated
employees.
1. Vesting- Delayed vesting adversely affects labor mobil-
ity. A worker who loses a pension plan's coverage before attain-
ing the age and service requirements for vesting forfeits all claim
to the plan's potential benefits. The importance of this factor in
a job change decision depends on the level of promised benefits,
the proximity of the qualifying date, and the age of the worker.
The hypothesis that pension plans influence labor mobility
has been confirmed in several studies that compare the behavior
of workers covered by a pension plan with that of noncovered
workers.38 A more recent and ambitious study by Bradley R.
Schiller and Randall D. Weiss attempted to move beyond the
pension/no pension dichotomy and determine to what extent the
specific features of a pension plan affect firm attachment. 9 Us-
36. Id. § 114, at 79 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 402 (1982)).
37. Id. § 201, at 107-09 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 416 (1982)).
38. Schiller & Weiss, The Impact of Private Pensions on Firm Attachment, 61 REV.
ECON. & STATISTICS 369 (1979) (citing JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., SUBCOMM. ON FISCAL POL-
icy, 93D CONG., 1ST SESS., STUDIES IN PUBLIC WELFARE No. 11, THE LABOR MARKET IM-
PACTS OF THE PRIVATE RETIREMENT SYSTEM (Comm. Print 1973) (prepared by Robert
Taggart) (1976)); 4 H. PARNES, THE PRE-RETIREMENT YEARS (1974); Flowers & Hughes,
Why Employees Stay, 51 HARV. Bus. REV. 49 (1973); R. Freeman, Non-Wage Effects of
Trade Unions on the Labor Market: An 'Exit-Voice' Model (1976) (unpublished manu-
script, Harvard University).
39. Schiller & Weiss, supra note 38, at 369.
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ing characteristics for 133 of the largest plans and earnings
records for workers in firms sponsoring these plans, Schiller and
Weiss tested the impact of particular vesting and benefit provi-
sions on the probability of quitting. Their results with regard to
the impact of vesting on firm attachment were predictable: (1)
quit rates fell among young workers as they approached vesting,
and then rose among vested workers once their benefits were se-
cured; and (2) stringent vesting requirements significantly in-
creased quits among younger workers, because of the low, dis-
counted expected value of benefits for such workers.
Nevertheless, these results offer some insight into the impact
ERISA's vesting changes have had on labor mobility.
ERISA undoubtedly has resulted in more rapid vesting. The
law specifies three alternative vesting procedures, 0 but most
United States companies have adopted the option that provides
one hundred percent vesting after ten years of service."1 Prior to
ERISA, some plans required employees to remain until retire-
ment to receive a benefit, but now almost any worker who leaves
a plan after ten years receives a retirement benefit.
Accelerating vesting has probably reduced the quit rate among
younger workers. Earlier vesting of retirement benefits greatly
increases the discounted expected value of benefits for this
group and lowers the likelihood that these workers will leave a
firm. On the other hand, ten-year vesting has probably increased
the likelihood of quits among workers with more than ten years
of service. Previously these workers might have remained with
the same employer fifteen or twenty years to become vested;
they now receive a benefit after ten years even if they leave. On
balance, ERISA's vesting provisions have probably increased
mobility.
2. Effect of inflation on vested benefits- Although the
vested worker has less to lose from changing jobs than the
nonvested worker, a worker still receives a lower benefit as a re-
sult of changing jobs than he would have received from continu-
ous coverage in a single plan. This difference arises because final
earnings levels determine pension benefits. The worker who re-
mains with a plan receives benefits related to earnings just
before retirement, but the mobile employee's benefits are based
on his earnings at the time he terminated employment. Assum-
40. ERISA § 203(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2) (1982).
41. W. MISCHO, S. CHANG & E. KASTON, CORPORATE PENSION PLAN STUDY: A GUIDE FOR
THE 1980's 338-40 (Bankers Trust, 1980) [hereinafter cited as CORPORATE PENSION PLAN
STUDY].
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ing that wages rise generally with seniority, the mobile employee
receives relatively lower benefits.
The magnitude of this effect depends, of course, on the rate
earnings rise during an employee's work life. Table 3 shows the
ratio of benefits for workers with continuous and discontinuous
employment under various assumptions about the rate of infla-
tion and wage growth. Even though all employers in this exam-
ple have identical plans, it is clear that the mobile employee is
severely penalized. If inflation were six percent, the pension of a
worker who held four jobs would equal fifty-one percent of the
pension of a worker who remained continuously employed by
one firm. If inflation were ten percent, the relative position of
the mobile employee would deteriorate further, so that his re-
tirement benefits would constitute only forty percent of that
awarded to the one-job worker. Thus, the higher the rate of in-
flation, the more discontinuous employment reduces the real
value of benefits. This erosion of benefits occurs because pension
plans do not index benefits to the inflation rate between termi-
nation of employment and retirement.
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TABLE 3
Comparison of Pension Benefits for a Four-Job Worker and a One-Job Workera
Compensation Ratio of benefits
base: Compensation rule four-job/
Item final payb  (percent of salary)c Benefits one-job worker
Inflation rate: 0 percent
Four-job workerd
Job 1 $ 10,000 10% $ 1,000 . . .
Job 2 10,000 10 1,000 ...
Job 3 10,000 10 1,000 ...
Job 4 10,000 10 1,000 ...
Total ... 40 4,000
1.00
One-job worker 10,000 40 4,000
Inflation rate: 6 percent
Four-job workerd
Job 1 17,908 10 1,790 ...
Job 2 32,071 10 3,207 ...
Job 3 57,435 10 5,744 . . .
Job 4 102,857 10 10,286 . . .
Total . . . 40 21,027
0.51
One-job worker 102,857 40 41,143
Inflation rate: 10 percent
Four-job workerd
Job 1 25,937 10 2,594 . . .
Job 2 67,275 10 6,728 ...
Job 3 174,494 10 17,449 ...
Job 4 452,593 10 45,259 ...
Total . . . 40 72,030
0.40
One-job worker 452,593 40 181,037
aAssumes a consistent annual increase in wages to compensate for inflation, and no
growth in wages due to productivity.
bBase salary is $10,000 and benefit is calculated on earnings in last year of employment.
CAssumes annual benefit accrual of one percent a year.
dAssumes worker stays at each job for 10 years.
Source: A. MUNNELL, THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 176 (Table 7-2) (1982).
Post-termination indexing meets with considerable resistance
in the United States, even though such a proposal was recently
introduced in Great Britain. Employers willingly provide im-
plicit indexation, by basing benefits on final salary, for people
who remain under their pension plans until retirement, but they
resist any indexation for terminated employees. Firms likely fear
bearing the full cost of increases due to unanticipated inflation
for terminated employees, whereas in the case of active employ-
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ees firms can shift the burden by slowing the rate of wage
growth. Furthermore, by providing lower benefits to mobile em-
ployees, firms can perhaps reduce employee turnover and more
readily retain skilled workers. Without post-termination index-
ing, however, the mobile employee suffers a substantial loss in
the value of this pension benefit because of inflation (see Table
4). ERISA did not address this issue and, therefore, the poten-
tial erosion of vested pension benefits continues to provide a sig-
nificant deterrent to labor mobility.
TABLE 4
Purchasing Power of $100 in Vested Benefits at Age 65, at Varying
Inflation Rates and Age at Job Termination
Annual Inflation Rate
Age at job termination 6 percent 8 percent 10 percent
30 $13 $7 $4
40 23 15 9
50 42 32 24
Source: Author's calculations.
3. Limits to the power of portability- Increased portability
alone cannot preserve the value of pension benefits between ter-
mination and retirement. Literally, portability means the ability
of an employee to transfer the present monetary value of vested
pension credits to a succeeding plan or a central clearinghouse
upon termination of employment.42 ERISA made some very mi-
nor changes to facilitate this type of portability. 3
The transferring of vested pension credits to an IRA or cen-
42. D. McGILL, PRESERVATION OF PENSION BENEFIT RIGHTS (1972). Several proposals
have been made over the years to create a central clearinghouse to permit workers to
transfer accrued pension credits. See M. BERNSTEIN, THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE PENSIONS
(1964); PRES. COMM. ON CORPORATE PENSION FUNDS, supra note 7; Pension Plans: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Retirement Income and Employment of the House Select
Comm. on Aging, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 529-65 (1978) (statement of Donald Grubbs).
43. First, ERISA requires each plan to provide an annual statement to the IRS re-
garding employees who have terminated employment that year with a right to a deferred
vested benefit. This information is passed on to the Social Security Administration
which will inform employees of their accumulated pension credits when they apply for
social security benefits. See ERISA § 209(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1059(a)(1) (1982). Second,
ERISA introduced "tax-free rollovers" whereby participants can transfer money from a
qualified pension plan to an IRA or another qualified plan within 60 days without paying
taxes. 26 U.S.C. § 402(a)(5) (1982). Finally, ERISA directs the PBGC to provide advice




tral clearinghouse, however, does not prevent the erosion in the
value of benefits given that market interest rates do not exceed
the interest assumption used by actuaries to calculate the dis-
counted value of the future benefit. Consider the example of a
fifty-year-old worker, who leaves a plan in which he has gained
credits equal to twenty percent of final pay, to be paid at age
sixty-five. At termination, his yearly salary totals $30,000; so the
plan entitles him to a benefit of $6,000 per year beginning at
sixty-five. If the actuaries assume an interest rate of eight per-
cent in calculating the present value of this sum, the worker will
receive $1,890 at age fifty to transfer to his IRA. If he earns
eight percent in his IRA, he will have $6,000 at retirement. At
that time, however, his salary would, most likely, have increased.
For example, if his salary ultimately increased to $60,000, his
pension if he had stayed with the firm would have equaled
$12,000, or twice the value of his deferred vested benefit. Thus,
transferring money to an IRA may not help the value of the pen-
sion keep pace with potential salary growth. The only possible
advantage to the employee lies in the chance that the interest
rate in the market is higher than that assumed by the actuaries.
Such a discrepancy would be unlikely to persist, however, if
portability provisions became widespread. Hence, increasing
portability of vested benefits would be unlikely to increase labor
mobility.
The concept of portability has gained substantial appeal, how-
ever, because many people have incorrectly interpreted it as a
means for allowing the mobile worker to count all service with
all employers toward meeting the conditions for a pension. This
type of "portability" exists in collectively bargained, multiem-
ployer plans, under which all of an employee's service for any of
the contributing employers functions as if it were service for a
single employer. This enables employees, who can expect to
work for many different employers and in several geographical
areas during the course of their working lives, to accumulate suf-
ficient service to qualify for a benefit. Enhancing this type of
transfer of service credits among defined benefit plans would re-
duce the loss a nonvested employee suffers and would enhance
labor mobility. ERISA did not, however, consider this type of
reform.
In summary, ERISA's vesting provisions have probably re-
duced mobility among younger workers, but facilitated mobility
among workers with more than ten years of service. For this lat-
ter group, however,, the potential loss in the value of frozen
vested benefits probably still acts as an important deterrent to
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job changes. Nevertheless, on balance, ERISA has improved mo-
bility, which is consistent with our national employment goals,
but contrary to employers' motivations for introducing pension
plans.
B. ERISA and Employment of Older Workers
Employer-sponsored defined benefit plans may adversely af-
fect the employment of older workers because the cost of provid-
ing benefits increases significantly with the age of the employee.
The younger an employee and the longer the period of his par-
ticipation, the more time a firm gains to earn interest on its con-
tribution and the greater the likelihood the worker will leave
before qualifying for benefits. Thus, because older workers are
closer to retirement and, therefore, more likely to remain under
the plan and to have fewer years to earn interest income on the
funds in their pension accounts, the cost of offering pensions to
this group is significantly higher than for younger workers. The
discrepancy in cost increases with the level of interest rates; con-
sequently, the cost differential today far surpasses that of the
1960's.
In competitive labor markets, employers could pay older
workers less in cash wages to compensate for the higher pension
cost. If employers do not have control over their wage structure
in the short run, however, due to union contracts or other insti-
tutional arrangements, then as alternative strategies for control-
ling costs employers may encourage turnover among older em-
ployees, through varying working conditions and other nonwage
characteristics of employment, and avoid hiring older workers.
ERISA contains two provisions that, at first glance, might miti-
gate the adverse impact of pension costs on hiring and retaining
older employees, and one provision that definitely makes the
hiring of older workers less attractive.
ERISA allows an employer to exclude from a pension plan any
employee hired within five years of the normal retirement age"
and to cease the accrual of benefits for an employee after age
sixty-five.4 5 In theory, both of these provisions should reduce the
cost of hiring an older employee and thereby increase the likeli-
hood of such an event. Setting the maximum participation age
at five years before normal retirement, however, represents an
44. ERISA § 202(a)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1052(a)(2)(B) (1982).
45. ERISA § 204, 29 U.S.C. § 1054 (1982).
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increase over earlier practices, under which the maximum age
was often ten to fifteen years before retirement. 46 In addition, it
seems unlikely that many firms would consciously employ older
workers to avoid pension costs, because this would run counter
to the purpose of having a plan-decreased employee turnover.
The second provision, which allows an employer to deny any
benefit accrual after normal retirement age, probably has little
impact on the hiring of older workers and also appears grossly
inconsistent with the 1978 legislation prohibiting mandatory re-
tirement before age seventy.
47
Although two ERISA provisions aim at controlling the cost
differential under defined benefit plans between old and young
workers, one of the vesting provisions included in ERISA exac-
erbates the cost differential. Companies that adopt the "rule of
45" vesting schedule, 8 whereby fifty percent vesting occurs
when the sum of the employee's age and service of a minimum
of five years equals forty-five, and ten percent vesting occurs
each year for the next five years, substantially increase the rela-
tive costs of hiring older workers. Under the "rule of 45," if a
worker aged forty were hired and worked for five years, then
fifty percent of her retirement benefits would vest at the end of
the five-year period. Under the identical vesting schedule a
thirty-year-old worker would not have any vested rights after
five years and a twenty-five-year-old would have no vested rights
until the tenth year of service.
Thus, although two provisions in ERISA have some potential
for stimulating the employment of older workers, neither stand-
ardizing the maximum participation age nor allowing benefit ac-
crual to cease after age sixty-five has succeeded in relieving em-
ployers of the high costs of hiring and retaining these workers.
This, in conjunction with the adverse effect of the "rule of 45"
on the costs of hiring older workers, indicates that the passage of
ERISA did not substantively reflect the national desire to in-
crease employment opportunities for older workers.
46. STAFF OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 93D CONG., 1ST SESS., STUDIES IN PUBLIC
WELFARE, PAPER No. 11: THE LABOR MARKET IMPACTS OF THE PRIVATE RETIREMENT SYS-
TEM 102 (Table 35) (Comm. Print 1973) (prepared by Robert Taggart).
47. Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
256, § 3, 92 Stat. 189, 189 (amending 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1976)).
48. ERISA § 203(a)(2)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2)(C) (1982).
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C. ERISA and Retirement Behavior
One of the original purposes of pension plans was to provide
employers with an impersonal and egalitarian means of retiring
older workers in order to restructure the age composition of
their work force. 49 Recent studies have confirmed that economic
factors, rather than health and other noneconomic considera-
tions, primarily determine a worker's retirement decision, and
that, all else equal, higher pension benefits will likely hasten a
worker's withdrawal from the labor force.50 Accordingly, any
change in benefit levels or the age at which benefits become
available should have an important impact on retirement
behavior.
Although ERISA contains no special provisions aimed at the
amount or timing of benefits provided by a qualified pension,
the legislation principally sought to ensure that individuals cov-
ered by pension plans receive pension benefits. As a result of the
legislation, more people reaching retirement age will have sup-
plementary private pension benefits than would have in the ab-
sence of ERISA. Consequently, the net impact of ERISA has
been to encourage earlier retirement. This effect, though, has
probably been mitigated somewhat by inflation during much of
the post-ERISA era, and the legislation's lack of provisions to
ensure that plan sponsors offer post-retirement cost-of-living ad-
justments. Without such adjustments, retirees' living standards
decline in retirement as inflation erodes the purchasing power of
their benefits. No amount of planning can ensure protection
from inflation, because the future pattern of price increases de-
fies prediction.
For private plans to provide benefits that keep pace with in-
flation, they must earn a return on fund assets that fully reflects
increases in the price level. In other words, pension funds must
be channeled into investments with real rates of return that are
not affected by inflation. Most of the evidence in the economic
literature suggests that real returns on corporate equities and
fixed-income securities decline in the face of unanticipated in-
creases in inflation. 1 Hence, plan sponsors cannot offer fully in-
49. W. GRAEBNER, A HISTORY OF RETIREMENT: THE MEANING AND FUNCTION OF AN
AMERICAN INSTITUTION 18-53 (1980).
50. The most careful analysis of the effect of pension benefits on the retirement deci-
sion is G. FIELDS & 0. MITCHELL, RETIREMENT, PENSIONS, AND SOCIAL SECURITY (1984).
For further studies, see bibliography included in the Fields-Mitchell monograph.
51. See Modigliani & Cohn, Inflation, Rational Valuation and the Market, FIN. ANA-
LYSTS J., Mar.-Apr. 1979, at 24; Oudet, The Variation of the Return on Stocks in Periods
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dexed benefits without incurring higher real costs. On the other
hand, although returns on assets do not fully incorporate the ef-
fects of inflation, nominal yields rise as the rate of price in-
creases accelerates. Although many plan sponsors currently pro-
vide ad hoc cost-of-living adjustments, others appropriate the
partial inflation premium incorporated in asset yields to reduce
their contributions. Therefore, real costs of providing pensions
may fall below costs incurred in the absence of inflation.
To increase the number of pension recipients eligible for cost-
of-living adjustments, Congress could amend ERISA to require
plan sponsors to value their firms' liability for benefits in pay-
ment status at a real rate of return of two or three percent and
to use anything above this amount to provide partial post-retire-
ment cost-of-living adjustments. 5' This form of indexing would
not impose additional real costs on plan sponsors beyond the
costs incurred in a noninflationary environment, and would en-
sure beneficiaries roughly the same inflation protection as indi-
vidual retirement investments.
Despite the lack of automatic post-retirement cost-of-living
adjustments, ERISA has probably led to more and earlier retire-
ment through ensuring that plan participants actually receive
pension benefits. This trend toward earlier retirement is not en-
tirely consistent with the public policy of permitting workers to
remain in the labor force for longer periods of time, and increas-
ing incentives in the private sector for early retirement will cre-
ate serious problems when the baby boom reaches retirement
age after the turn of the century.
III. ERISA AND RETIREMENT INCOME POLICY
National retirement income goals have been expressed in a va-
riety of ways-through federal legislation, by White House Con-
ferences on Aging and, most recently, by the President's Com-
mission on Pension Policy.53 The recommendation of the
President's Commission was the most specific and the most am-
of Inflation, 8 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 247 (1973); Lintner, Inflation and Security
Returns, J. FIN., May 1975, at 259; Fama, Stock Returns, Real Activity, Inflation and
Money, 71 A. EcON. REv. 545 (1981).
52. For a comprehensive discussion of indexation, see H. MYERS, INDEXATION OF PEN-
SIONS AND OTHER BENEFITS (1979).
53. For a summary of these goals, see E. MmEE, C. DrrrmAR & B. ToRREY, RETIRE-
MENT INCOME GOALS (Mar. 1980) (working paper for the President's Commission on Pen-
sion Policy).
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bitious-namely, to ensure the full replacement of preretirement
disposable income.54 The White House Conferences on Aging
have emphasized the need to establish a minimum level of re-
tirement income, and to maintain adequate total benefits
throughout the retirement period.
To meet these retirement goals, a three-tiered system of re-
tirement income maintenance has developed in the United
States. This system consists of (1) welfare programs, such as the
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, 55 which provides
a minimum guaranteed income to the needy elderly; (2) compul-
sory public contributory programs, such as Federal Old-Age,
Survivors, and Disability Insurance Benefits (OASDI); 5' and (3)
private provisions for retirement through private pensions and
individual savings. In view of the substitutability of the pro-
grams, the importance of private pensions in the provision of re-
tirement income depends upon the gap between the income re-
quirements of the elderly and the benefits provided by
government programs-primarily social security.
The extent to which social security benefits meet the income
goals of the elderly can be assessed against two alternative meas-
ures: an absolute standard of living and the maintenance of pre-
retirement living standards. For measurement against an abso-
lute standard, budgets the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
constructed previously served as useful benchmarks. These
budgets represented the cost of hypothetical lists of goods and
services for retired couples at three relative standards of living.
The Bureau annually updated these budgets on the basis of
changes in the Consumer Price Index and in consumer expendi-
ture patterns. Because publication of the BLS budget data was
discontinued in 1982, updated budgets can be estimated only by
increasing the 1981 level by the Consumer Price Index, making
no adjustment for changes in consumption patterns. Using this
approach, the low, intermediate, and high budgets for a retired
couple were estimated at $7,900, $11,200, and $16,500, respec-
tively, for the autumn of 1983. Even though these budgets may
be too high as a level for welfare support, the 1982 White House
Conference on Aging designated the intermediate budget as the
minimum standard for aged couples in the United States. The
intermediate budget, therefore, presents a reasonable goal for
combined social security and private pension benefits for a
54. PRES. COMM'N REP., supra note 2, at 42.
55. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383(c) (1982).
56. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433 (1982).
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worker with a history of average earnings and steady
employment.
5 7
As shown in Table 5, social security benefits in 1984 for a re-
tired couple with average earnings amount to about eighty-seven
percent of the intermediate budget. For those with a history of
earnings at the taxable maximum, benefits exceed the interme-
diate budget by thirteen percent and benefits for low-wage
workers equal fifty-eight percent of the intermediate budget.
The diagonal elements of the table, however, may represent the
most relevant data, because they present the three couples in
post-retirement income groups that correspond with their re-
spective pre-retirement income groups. It is difficult to argue
that a low-wage couple earning $7,000 in 1983 should receive a
social security benefit of $11,200 to attain the intermediate
budget. The diagonal percentages indicate that social security
benefits to couples with low, average, and maximum earnings
amount to approximately eighty-two percent, eighty-seven per-
cent, and seventy-seven percent of the low, intermediate, and
high budgets, respectively. 8
TABLE 5
Social Security Benefits for a Retired Couple, January 1984, as a
Percentage of Three Budget Levelsa
1983 earnings of retired Low Intermediate High
worker and spouse, both budget budget budget
age 65b ($7,900) ($11,200) ($16,500)
Low earnings ($7,000) 82% 58% 39%
Average earnings ($15,100) 124 87 59
Maximum earnings ($35,700) 160 113 77
a Budgets are projected to autumn 1983. The projections are based on a 6.2% in-
crease in the consumer price index in 1982 and a 3.2% increase in 1983.
b The annual social security benefit amounts payable to a worker and spouse retir-
ing in 1984 with 1983 earnings equal to the low, average, and maximum earnings levels
are $6,498, $9,770, and $12,665, respectively.
Source: Author's calculations based on U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Three Budgets
for a Retired Couple, Autumn 1981, BLS NEWS, July 30, 1982.
57. 1981 WHITE HousE CONFERENCE ON AGING, COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS FROM
WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON AGING recommendation 23, at 3 (Nov. 30-Dec. 31, 1981).
58. Although the benefits in Table 5 include the 50% supplement for a nonworking
spouse, the percentages would be identical for retired individuals, assuming that the cost
of supporting a couple is 50% greater than it is for an individual.
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Social security benefits can also be evaluated in terms of pre-
retirement living standards rather than against a monetary
standard, in which case replacement rates rather than benefit
levels comprise the relevant measure of benefit adequacy. Once a
minimum level of income support is assured, a replacement
rate-the ratio of benefits to preretirement earnings-is actually
a more appropriate criterion against which to assess wage-re-
lated benefit programs.
Retirees require considerably less than one hundred percent of
their preretirement income to maintain their standard of living.
First, whereas preretirement earnings are subject to federal in-
come tax, social security payroll tax, and state and municipal
income taxes, a large portion of retirement income escapes taxa-
tion.59 Second, work-related expenses, such as transportation,
clothing, and meals purchased away from home, decline during
retirement. Finally, expenditures decrease for services such as
cleaning and cooking that a person purchased while working, but
that a retiree is likely to perform for himself. Due to lower taxes,
reduced work expenses, and lower expenditures for household
services, retirees require approximately sixty-four to eighty-one
percent of preretirement earnings to maintain their preretire-
ment living standards (see Table 6).
59. Social security benefits, which constitute the bulk of retirement income, are not
taxable for most retirees. For taxpayers, though, whose incomes exceed certain base
amounts, up to one-half of their social security and Railroad Retirement Tier 1 benefits
are included in taxable income. The base amounts are $25,000 for a single taxpayer,
$32,000 for married taxpayers filing jointly, and zero for married taxpayers filing sepa-
rately. Income for purposes of calculating these base amounts includes adjusted gross
income and one-half of the excess of the taxpayer's combined income, adjusted gross
income plus one-half of benefits, over the base amount. For more detail, see Svahn &
Ross, Social Security Amendments of 1983: Legislative History and Summary of Provi-
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Table 7 presents social security replacement rates for various
types of hypothetical beneficiaries retiring at the beginning of
1984.
TABLE 7
Social Security Replacement Rates by Type of Beneficiary,
Early 1984
Preretirement earningsa
Age and Low Average Mfiiinum
type of beneficiary ($7 ,000)b ($15,100)c ($3 5,700)d
Single worker
Age 65 62.2% 43.0% 23.7%
Age 62 49.7 34.4 18.9
Worker age 65, with spouse
Age 65 93.3 64.5 35.5
Age 62 85.5 59.2 32.5
Worker age 62, with spouse
Age 65 80.8 55.9 30.7
Age 62 73.0 50.5 27.8
Widow age 65, spouse retired at
Age 65 62.2 43.0 23.7
Age 62 51.5 35.7 19.6
a 19 83 earnings levels.
bAssumes an annual income slightly below the minimum wage during working years.
CAssumes an annual income approximately equal to the average of total wages in
each year of work life.
dAssumes income equal to the maximum taxable amount each year of work life.
Source: Author's calculations based on unpublished data from Social Security Adminis-
tration, Office of the Actuary (July 1984).
As illustrated, a worker aged sixty-five earning $15,100, the aver-
age earnings level in 1983, received a benefit in early 1984 equal
to forty-three percent of preretirement earnings; to maintain his
preretirement standard of living, he would need approximately
sixty-nine percent of prior earnings (Table 6). The replacement
rate for a couple with average earnings eligible for the fifty per-
cent supplementary spouse's benefit amounts to 64.5%, while
the couple requires a replacement rate of seventy-one percent to
maintain its preretirement standard of living.
These comparisons, however, probably overstate the adequacy
of social security in providing retirement income for two reasons.
First, the analytical construct of a hypothetical individual with a
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history of average earnings exaggerates the size of social security
benefits. Even though the "average earner" designation implies
that the replacement rate for an "average earner" reflects the
replacement rate for retiring workers in the approximate middle
of the earnings distribution of all retiring workers, that is simply
not the case.60 Rather, the concept of average earnings arises
from a composite of earnings for all workers at all stages in their
careers and does not reflect the fact that earnings of retiring
workers usually surpass those of their younger counterparts. For
instance, the average earnings for men in 1983 equalled $19,175,
whereas the average for full-time men in their mid-fifties and
early sixties amounted to $27,084. In other words, the "average"
preretirement man in 1983 actually earned close to the taxable
maximum of $35,700 in 1983. Thus, the "average" replacement
rate amounts not to forty-three percent, but to thirty to thirty-
five percent of preretirement earnings.
Second, the assumption that people retire at sixty-five exag-
gerates the relative level of social security benefits. In early 1964,
sixty-four percent of workers receiving social security benefits
had retired before age sixty-five. For the "average" worker, re-
tirement at age sixty-two reduces the replacement rate from
forty-three percent to thirty-four percent. Indeed, data on actual
replacement rates for men in the middle quintile of the income
distribution showed benefits equal to thirty-two percent of pre-
retirement earnings (Table 2). In short, conventional replace-
ment rate analyses exaggerate the extent to which social security
benefits replace preretirement income and consequently under-
estimate the importance of private pensions.
If full replacement of disposable income is the nation's retire-
ment income goal and social security meets roughly three-
quarters of this goal for the low-income recipient, half for the
middle-income worker, and a third for the person with a history
of maximum earnings, then private pensions have an important
supplementary role to play throughout the income distribution.
Do the provisions of ERISA enhance or restrict the ability of
private pension plans to fulfill their required role?
60. The following discussion is based on work by James H. Schulz. For a statement of
his argument, see PRES. COMM'N REP., supra note 2, at 82-83 (testimony before the Presi-
dent's Commission on Pension Policy, Jan. 11, 1980).
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A. Enhancing the Likelihood of Benefit Receipt
ERISA principally sought to ensure that more employees cov-
ered by qualified pension plans actually receive benefits in re-
tirement. The participation, vesting, and insurance provisions in
the legislation significantly increase the probability of a covered
worker receiving a benefit. Some commentators have argued,
however, that ERISA has reduced the incentive to establish de-
fined benefit plans and encouraged employers to terminate ex-
isting plans, thereby lowering the number of workers who could
expect to receive pensions from a defined benefit plan. Indeed, a
rash of defined benefit plan terminations occurred following the
enactment of ERISA
1
One should consider three important points, however, when
assessing the impact of ERISA on the number of people who will
ultimately receive benefits. First, to the extent that abuse ex-
isted prior to ERISA, any attempt to impose constraints on the
operations of pension plans will encourage employers with no in-
tention of fulfilling benefit commitments to terminate their pen-
sion plans. Workers lost very little retirement income protection
by this type of termination. Second, the passage of ERISA pre-
ceded an extremely severe recession that put economic pressure
on many businesses to terminate their plans. In surveys con-
ducted by the PBGC to determine the reasons for plan termina-
tion, employers cited either business failure or generally adverse
business conditions as the major reason for plan termination in
the majority of cases, while ERISA was an important factor to
less than seventeen percent of the terminating employers . 2 The
business cycle has continued to have an important effect on pen-
sion plan terminations. Terminations declined sharply after 1976
as the economy recovered and then rose again in 1982 and 1983
in the wake of the severe economic downturn. Finally, although
many plans have disbanded since the passage of ERISA, more
defined benefit plans exist today than in 1974. The number of
these plans grew by forty-two percent, from 232,838 in 1974 to
330,485 in 1983.6a This increase occurred over a period when the
labor force grew by only sixteen percent.
61. See SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, supra note 31, at 114-15 (chapter by D. Salisbury).
62. PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORPORATION, PREMIUM REQUIREMENTS FOR THE SIN-
GLE EMPLOYER BASIC BENEFITS INSURANCE PROGRAM, PART I SUMMARY REPORT, 111-16
(Table 3).




In short, ERISA's provisions designed to ensure the delivery
of pension benefits will result in more workers receiving pen-
sions than would have in the absence of ERISA. This aspect of
the legislation operates consistently with the nation's retirement
income policy, which requires supplementation of social security
benefits by private pensions to avoid a substantial decline in
economic well-being upon retirement.
B. Introduction of Joint-and-Survivor Option
One of the major failures of this nation's retirement income
system is illustrated by the large number of elderly single
women with incomes below the poverty line. 4 This situation has
arisen, in part, because before 1974 most pension plans made no
provision for retirees' surviving spouses. The passage of ERISA
reversed this trend by requiring that pension plans offer spousal
protection through the provision of joint-and-survivor annui-
ties. 5 Such an annuity consists of a worker's pension payable
over the life of the participant plus a survivor pension payable
over the life of the surviving spouse. A retiree usually purchases
the extra protection offered by the joint-and-survivor option
through reductions in the retiree's own pension, and most plans
automatically provide such an option unless the retiree rejects it
in writing. The introduction of the joint-and-survivor option is
consistent with the nation's retirement income goals and should
contribute to the well-being of elderly widows.
C. Gaps in Protection ERISA Did Not Address
The preceding assessment of retirement goals reveals that all
workers need additional retirement income beyond social secu-
rity benefits to maintain preretirement standards of living. Yet
supplementary pension plans cover only half the work force and
IRS integration guidelines allow plans to pay few or no benefits
to low-paid workers. In addition, private pension benefits are
not automatically indexed after retirement, so their real value
can decline substantially if inflation accelerates. Although all
these failures are inconsistent with a sensible retirement income
64. See, e.g., BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, CONSUMER IN-
COME, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION BELOW THE POVERTY LEVEL: 1983 (Table 11).
65. ERISA § 205, 29 U.S.C. § 1055 (1982).
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policy, ERISA addressed none of them.
1. Coverage- Although ERISA attempted to correct per-
ceived abuses and inequities in the private pension system, the
legislation did not mandate the establishment of such plans.
Consequently, the formation and continuation of pension plans
by employers or through collective bargaining remains a strictly
voluntary decision. As a result, pension coverage is far from
universal.
Considerable controversy surrounds estimates of the extent of
pension coverage. Some experts argue that very young, part-
time, or mobile workers would not participate in a company's
pension plan even if offered the opportunity and thus should be
excluded from coverage statistics. Because of the controversy,
two surveys conducted in 1979 sought to determine the extent of
pension plan coverage. The President's Commission on Pension
Policy found that 48.1% of all active workers eighteen years and
older were participants in some type of employment-based pen-
sion, profit-sharing, or retirement plan in their current jobs."6
The Census Bureau found nearly identical results in a similar
survey of private pension plans conducted for the Department of
Labor and the Social Security Administration."' Analysis of the
Census Bureau's survey, however, indicates that the coverage
picture improves as the definition of the eligible population nar-
rows. For full-time workers over twenty-five with one or more
years of service with their current employer, coverage increased
to sixty-one percent.68
Because of the influence of industry structure on pension cov-
erage, the percentage of the work force covered by pension plans
will not likely increase significantly in the future. Industries with
traditionally high pension coverage, such as manufacturing, are
expected to employ a declining share of workers, while employ-
ment in industries with low pension coverage, such as retail
trade and services, is projected to increase. Moreover, small
66. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON PENSION POLICY, PRELIMINARY FINDINGS OF A NATION-
WIDE SURVEY ON RETIREMENT ISSUES 2 (1980) [hereinafter cited as PRELIMINARY
FINDINGS].
67. D. BELLER, PATTERNS OF WORKER COVERAGE BY PRIVATE PENSION PLANS (Dep't of
Labor, Labor-Management Servs. Admin., Pension & Welfare Benefit Programs (1980)).
For a summary of survey results, see Belier, Coverage Patterns of Full-Time Employees
Under Private Retirement Plans, Soc. SECURITY BULL., July 1981, at 3; Rogers, Vesting
of Private Pension Benefits in 1979 and Change from 1972, Soc. SECURITY BULL., July
1981, at 12.
68. This figure must be interpreted cautiously because only 58% of the private sector
work force fell into the category of full-time, over 25, more than one year of service with
current employer, and over 1,000 hours of work a year. PRELIMINARY FINDINGS, supra
note 66, at 3.
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businesses, which employ the bulk of noncovered workers, are
unlikely to adopt pension plans. These businesses operate on
very tight profit margins in highly competitive environments
and cannot afford the additional cost of pension plans, especially
because the relative cost of establishing such plans tends to be
higher for small firms.
Indeed, preliminary tabulations from a May 1983 survey indi-
cate that pension coverage has actually declined in the 1979-83
period (see Table 8).
TABLE 8
Percent of Nonagricultural Wage and Salary Workers Covered by
Pension Plans, 1979 and 1983
Percent covered by pension plan
Earnings levels 1979 1983
Total 61.1% 56.1%
$1- 4,999 n.a. 24.3






50,000 and over n.a. 84.9
Not reported n.a. 27.2
Addenda:
Private sector only




Source: Employee Benefit Research Institute Issue Brief, New Survey Findings on Pen-
sion Coverage and Benefit Entitlement, Aug. 1984, at 5, 16, 17 (Tables 1, 8, 9).
Again, the precise percentage of the work force covered depends
on the definition of the eligible population. Including govern-
ment employees, most of whom have pension coverage, the per-
centage of the work force covered by pension plans has fallen
from 61.1% to 56.1%. In terms of the private sector only, cover-
age has fallen from 51.0% to 47.1% of private employment, or
from 56.2% to 51.1% of private wage and salary workers.
Regardless of the coverage figures selected, a large part of the
FALL 19851
Journal of Law Reform
United States work force remains uncovered by a private pen-
sion plan. In most industries the uncovered employees are heav-
ily concentrated in small companies and tend to be at the lower
end of the wage scale."9 Table 8 illustrates the concentration of
coverage among higher paid workers. Even though this table de-
scribes coverage by public as well as private pension plans, it
nevertheless shows the strong correlation between income class
and pension plan coverage.
In enacting ERISA, Congress recognized that a large segment
of the working population was ineligible for the tax advantages
associated with private pension plans. Instead of mandating cov-
erage, however, ERISA established individual retirement ac-
counts for workers not participating in a plan and liberalized
contribution limits on Keogh plans for the self-employed. But
while the ERISA provisions broadened the group eligible for
tax-deferred retirement plans, most of the benefits accrued to
higher income persons. Thus, the problem of inadequate cover-
age remains. Although the substantial tax concessions offered
higher paid workers have encouraged the growth of private
plans, these concessions have not led to widespread coverage
among lower paid workers.
2. Integration- The major conclusion that emerges from
careful consideration of replacement rates provided by social se-
curity benefits is that low-income as well as high-income individ-
uals need supplementary retirement income to maintain their
preretirement living standards. Hence, little justification exists
for allowing plans to "fully" or "maximally" integrate with social
security so that lower paid workers receive no benefits at all
from their pension plans. ERISA failed to address the gaps in
protection that arise because of the current integration provi-
sions and, therefore, to go far enough to be considered totally
consistent with existing retirement income policy.
3. Inflation indexing- Recommendations from the White
House Conferences on Aging have stressed the importance not
only of establishing initial benefits at appropriate levels, but also
of maintaining the value of those benefits over the entire retire-
ment period. Although social security and federal government
pension plans provide automatic cost-of-living adjustments,
69. Coverage has been shown to be directly related to both wage rates and firm size.
In 1972 only 18% of private nonfarm workers earning less than $3 an hour were in firms
with retirement plan expenditures. The comparable figure for those earning $7 or more
an hour was 88%. Similarly, only 38% of firms with under 100 employees provided re-
tirement benefits as against 93% of firms with 500 or more employees. Bell, Prevalence
of Private Retirement Plans, MONTHLY LAE. REv., Oct. 1975, at 18.
[VOL. 19:1
ERISA-The First Decade
most private plans do not offer similar protection.
Sponsors of private plans, nevertheless, have been aware of
the erosive power of inflation and have usually provided some ad
hoc adjustments for beneficiaries. The 1980 Bankers Trust
study7" indicates that during the 1975-79 period roughly seventy
percent of the 325 plans surveyed extended a cost-of-living ad-
justment to some or all of their beneficiaries. Nearly three out of
five plans that provided adjustments, however, did so only once
during the period. According to Bankers Trust calculations, the
average cost-of-living adjustment over the 1975-79 period for
persons who retired in January 1975 equaled a one-time increase
in their pension of $480, or nine percent, under a conventional
plan and $660, or eight percent, under a pattern plan.7 1 Because
the CPI rose forty-seven percent over the same period, most re-
tirees experienced a substantial decline in their living standards.
A slightly more favorable picture emerges from a survey of
post-retirement cost-of-living adjustments between 1973 and
1979 for a nationally representative sample of persons in defined
benefit plans who retired prior to 1973.72 The mean benefit for
this group rose from $2,129 in 1973 to $2,639 in 1979, an in-
crease of twenty-four percent. The benefit increases were fairly
widespread, with seventy-five percent of the group receiving at
least one adjustment. Nevertheless, because the CPI rose by
sixty-three percent between 1973 and 1979, the cost-of-living ad-
justments compensated for less than two-fifths of the total price
increase.
The lack of automatic cost-of-living adjustments means that
retirees cannot know whether their private pension benefits will
retain their value over the full period of their retirement. This
type of uncertainty is inconsistent with the nation's retirement
70. CORPORATE PENSION PLAN STUDY, supra note 41.
71. Under conventional plans, which account for three-quarters of the Bankers Trust
sample, most firms increased pensions by a stated percentage for each year of retirement.
The most common figure was two or three percent, so that a person who retired in 1975
would have received an eight to twelve percent increase in his pension over the 1975-79
period. Other firms increased pensions by a flat percentage, usually ten percent. And
some other firms simply increased benefits by a fixed percentage that depended on the
employee's retirement date; for example, fifteen percent if he retired before 1966, ten
percent if he retired between 1966 and 1970, and five percent if he retired between 1971
and 1975. Under pattern plans, an increase of a flat dollar amount or dollar increase for
each year of service was most common. Id. at 52-55.
72. R. CLARK, S. ALLEN & D. SUMNER, INFLATION AND PENSION BENEFITS (final report
under Dep't of Labor Contract No. J-9-P-1-0074, Aug. 1983); S. ALLEN, R. CLARK & D.
SUMNER, POST-RETIREMENT ADJUSTMENTS OF PENSION BENEFITS (working paper No. 1364)
(National Bureau of Economic Research, June 1984).
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income goals as expressed by the White House Conferences on
Aging and other groups.
CONCLUSION
ERISA successfully ameliorated many of the problems that
existed in the private pension system. No longer do workers for-
feit pension rights because of overstrict participation and vest-
ing requirements, mismanagement of pensiofi assets, or the ter-
mination of insufficiently funded plans. As a result of the
legislation, more people covered by qualified pension plans now
receive benefits.
The major goal of ERISA, to ensure the receipt of benefits, is
fully consistent with the objectives of federal tax policy. The
favorable tax provisions associated with qualified pension plans
have sought to induce higher paid employees to adopt retire-
ment savings plans that will also benefit the rank and file. IRAs
provide the only exception in ERISA to generally accepted tax
policy goals. Although Congress developed these accounts to ex-
pand the opportunity for tax-deferred saving, their lack of non-
discrimination requirements has resulted in considerably greater
usage among high-income than low-income workers.
The consistency of ERISA with national employment goals
defies easy assessment, because the interests of individual em-
ployers and public policymakers diverge dramatically. For exam-
ple, ERISA has probably encouraged earlier retirement by en-
suring that more workers receive private pension benefits to
supplement social security benefits. This outcome may be con-
sistent with the preferences of employers, who established pen-
sion plans in large part to retire superannuated workers, but it
may be inconsistent with public policy that would permit work-
ers to postpone retirement. Similarly, more rapid vesting has
probably increased mobility among workers with more than ten
years of service. Greater mobility may increase macroeconomic
efficiency, but the interest of the individual employer rests with
retaining highly trained workers.
The main purpose of ERISA-to ensure the receipt of private
pension benefits-fully comports with national retirement in-
come goals. Social security benefits alone fail to maintain prere-
tirement living standards for retirees at any income level; conse-
quently, most individuals would experience a decline in their
economic well-being upon retirement without supplementary
private pension benefits. By ensuring that more workers covered
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under a private pension plan receive the retirement benefits due
them, ERISA has made progress toward the President's Com-
mission on Pension Policy's recommended goal of fully replacing
preretirement disposable income.
Most of ERISA's major provisions seem consistent with na-
tional goals, with the possible exception of IRAs and the effect
of increased benefit security on retirement behavior. Inconsis-
tencies between national goals and present pension policy arise
over issues that ERISA did not address. For example, in the
area of tax policy, ERISA failed to consider ways to ameliorate
inequities created by the current integration guidelines or to ex-
plore alternatives to a totally employer-financed pension system.
In employment policy, ERISA failed to address the erosive im-
pact of inflation on the vested benefits of mobile employees and
to consider ways to reduce the higher costs of employing older
workers. The greatest failings of ERISA are in retirement in-
come policy, where partial coverage, liberal integration guide-
lines, and lack of post-retirement indexing leave serious gaps in
the nation's retirement system.
The major conclusion that emerges from the preceding analy-
sis is that ERISA has proven extremely successful and has amel-
iorated many of the documented inequities in the private pen-
sion system. But some significant problems still remain, because
Congress could not address all inequities in 1974. In addition,
other concerns have become more pressing since the passage of
ERISA, such as the effect of inflation on the value of benefits
during work years and in retirement. The continuation of past
problems and the development of new concerns indicate that, a
decade after ERISA, the time may have arrived to formulate
new pension legislation.
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